A duress password opens an empty decoy vault and quietly clears the real one, so an unlock forced under pressure gives nothing away. This is an Android feature today. Read the whole guide before you set one, because the real vault is destroyed on use.
The duress unlock clears the real vault. That is the whole point, but it means any identity or note you cannot afford to lose should already exist in a backup somewhere else before you go further. Treat duress as a safeguard, not as storage.
Go to the vault security settings where the unlock password is managed. The duress password is set alongside your normal password.
Choose a duress password that is clearly different from your real one, and one you will still recall under stress. It should look as ordinary as your real password, because the point is that no one can tell them apart.
Re-enter the duress password to confirm and save it. From now on that password opens an empty vault and clears the real one.
Before you rely on it, confirm the behavior on a spare install or an empty vault: the duress password should open a vault with nothing in it, look identical to a normal unlock, and leave no sign that a real vault existed. Do not test it on your real vault, because the test would destroy it.
Not yet. Duress is an Android feature today. iOS has the full signing surface but not duress; it is planned next.
Not from the outside. A correct password, the duress password, and a wrong password behave the same way on the lock screen: same flow, same timing, no state that flags which was entered.
It is cleared as the decoy opens. This is destructive by design, so keep a backup of any identity or note you cannot afford to lose.
No. Once the decoy is in place biometric unlock is torn down and the vault opens with a password only, so no fingerprint prompt survives to contradict the decoy.
Free file encryption for iOS and Android. No accounts, no tracking, no servers.
