Can a source send me an encrypted file with age?

Yes, if they encrypt it to your public recipient. Publish your age recipient (or an SSH public key), and a source can seal a file to it with AgePony or the age CLI. Only your private key opens it.

Does AgePony hide who is talking to whom?

No. age encrypts file contents, not metadata. It does not hide that a file was sent, its size, or the channel it traveled on. For source protection, the delivery channel matters as much as the encryption.

Is this enough for high-risk source protection?

On its own, no. Encryption is one layer. Serious source protection also needs careful operational security, a safe delivery channel, and often purpose-built systems like SecureDrop. AgePony protects the file contents; it does not protect the relationship.

For journalists

age for journalists.

AgePony can let a source seal a document so only you can read it, and let you reply in kind. That's genuinely useful — but encryption is one layer, not the whole answer. This page is honest about where it helps and where it doesn't.

Receive from sources Reply securely Honest threat model

The workflow this addresses.

A source has a file they can only share with you. You publish a public recipient; they encrypt the file to it; you decrypt it on a device you control. The document's contents are protected from anyone who intercepts it along the way. That's the part age does well.

What age does for you here, and what it doesn't.

gives you

Content confidentiality

A file encrypted to your key can only be opened by your key. If it's intercepted in transit, sitting in a cloud folder, or on a seized server, the contents stay sealed. You can also sign your own replies so a source knows a message truly came from you.

does not give you

Metadata or channel protection

age does not hide that communication happened, who the parties are, when, how often, or the file's size. It has no forward secrecy and isn't real-time chat. If the risk is the existence of contact being discovered, encryption alone won't address it — the channel and operational security do.

A concrete workflow.

Generate an age identity in AgePony and publish its age1… recipient where a source can find it (a contact page, a profile).
The source encrypts their document to that recipient, using AgePony or the age CLI, and sends the resulting .age file.
You decrypt it on a device you control. The contents were never readable in transit.
To reply, encrypt to the source's recipient if they've shared one, and sign your message so they can confirm it's from you.
Treat the delivery channel as a separate problem — encryption protects the file, not the fact that you and the source are in contact.

Is AgePony right for this?

yes if

You want sources to be able to seal documents to you.
The main risk is the file's contents being read in transit or at rest.
You want a simple tool a less technical source can manage.
You're combining it with sound operational security.

not enough on its own if

The risk is that contact itself is discovered — you need anonymity and metadata protection.
You face a well-resourced adversary and need a hardened intake system like SecureDrop.
You need forward secrecy or deniability — different tools entirely.

Related material.

See generating an age key and decrypting a file on mobile. For threat-model questions about what encryption can and can't do, the security page goes deeper.

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